INTRODUCTION TO THE ILW PANEL ON "NEW
INITIATIVES IN INVESTMENT LAW: USING
TRADE AGREEMENTS TO 'CONTROL' CAPITAL
MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS"
Cynthia Lichtenstein
The Panel speakers on this topic were Deborah Siegel, Esq., Senior Counsel, Legal Department, International Monetary Fund (whose paper follows),
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, University Professor, Columbia University (giving
the viewpoint of an economist), and Mr. James Wallace, standing in for Randall
Quarels, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, United States Department
of the Treasury. The Treasury Department was at the forefront of the negotiation of the "transfers" provisions of the recently concluded United States-Chile
and United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreements, which were discussed by
the Panel. Cynthia Lichtenstein, the organizer and moderator of the Panel,
introduced the topic as follows:
The subject matter of this Panel is the "free transfers" provision that the
United States government has recently been inserting into the bilateral free trade
agreements that it has been negotiating with a number of countries. Such a
provision appears in the investment chapter contained in the most recent free
trade agreements, namely with Singapore and Chile, and the Fact Sheet on
United States-Singapore free transfers (which may be found at www.ustr.gov)
states that "retaining the principle of free transfers sends a strong signal to the
markets that the U.S. and Singapore support the free flow of capital and
recognize its importance in economic development." That Fact Sheet also
provides that "The free transfers provision of the Singapore FTA meets an
important Trade Promotion Authority... objective-'freeing the transfer of
funds relating to investments."'
The background to these transfer provisions is important to consider. We
all know that there is an important linkage between both trade in goods and
services and payments for those goods and services, and that payments are made
in currency. Thus the GATT and WTO efforts at liberalization of trade are
paralleled by the IMF Agreement provisions outlawing restrictions on payments
for current transactions. Equally, when an investor wants to take out of the host
country dividends or interest on a foreign direct investment, the investor needs
to be allowed to convert the host country currency dividends or interest into a
currency that the investor needs.
Now, it is possible to extend these concepts further: if what one is trying
to create, as the European Community is in the process of doing, is an integrated
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financial market, it is necessary to provide for free convertibility for short term
investments, or what we call "portfolio investments." However, for a legal
system to provide that currency will be freely transferable not only for current
payments (as is the obligation of most parties to the International Monetary
Fund Agreement), but also for all capital investments whether short term or long
term, is a bit more problematic for the host government. Macroeconomic
management may require the ability to staunch, extreme, and sudden capital
outflows.
This problem does not arise in the case of foreign direct investment, which
by definition involves control of a host country enterprise. The foreign investor
cannot in any event instantaneously withdraw his investment since the investor
will want to get the control premium on resale of the investment as well as any
appreciation. However, in the case of short term investments in debt or equity,
so-called "hot money flows," the investor wants assurance that it can take its
money and run at the first sign of economic difficulty of the host country. There
is considerable academic writing today on this phenomenon of herd behavior in
the case of short-term capital inflows. It is this desire on the part of portfolio
investors to have convertibility at the very moment that a better return is sighted
elsewhere that may be considered to necessitate the inclusion in any transfer
provisions in a treaty of a safeguards clause.
It may be noted that the grandparent of all investment agreements with a
free transfer clause, the aborted Multinational Investment Agreement which was
being drafted under the auspices of the OECD (the "MAr'), in its last draft of
the definition of "investment" (which was highly inclusive as is the definition
in the most recent United States bilateral Free Trade Agreements, covering not
only direct investment but also all forms of intangible property), contained a
footnote to the definition that said: "The Negotiating Group agrees that this
broad definition of investment calls for further work on appropriate safeguard
provisions."
However, the United States-Chile and United States-Singapore free trade
agreements' transfer provisions do not include any safeguard clauses. What I
wanted to tell you, as an introduction to the Panel, is the history of the European
Community's handling of capital controls in the process of their creation of their
financial single market, as I think that history is rather enlightening. In the
process of creating a "single market" as the European Community's economic
integration process is called, a detailed history of the liberalization of intermember state capital movements is given in Bermann, Goebel, Davey, and Fox,
European Union Law, 2nd Ed., in their Chapter thirty two on Free Movement
of Capital and the Integrated Financial Market. I cannot give here all of that
detail, but very briefly, by 1988, after the Commission's 1985 White Paper on
Completing the Internal Market urged greater liberalization of capital movements, the Community enacted Directive 88/361 to implement then Article 67
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of the Treaty of Rome. Briefly, that Directive required abolition of all restrictions on movements of capital taking place between persons resident in the
member states. However, its Article 3 provided that "where short-term capital
movements of exceptional magnitude impose severe strains on foreign exchange
markets and lead to serious disturbances in the conduct of a member state's
monetary and exchange rate policies," the Commission, after certain consultations, might authorize the member state to take protective measures, "the
conditions and details of which the Commission shall determine." In short, a
safeguard clause was provided, but the measures taken by the states in an
emergency would be overseen by the Commission. Paragraph two of Article 3
permitted the member state itself to take the protective measures "on grounds
of urgency should those measures be necessary." In this case, the Commission
was to decide whether the member state might continue to apply the measures,
or whether it should amend or abolish them, and in any event, the period of
application of the protective measures was limited to six months.
Now with the introduction of the Euro for twelve of the fifteen member
states, and a unified control of monetary policy for those twelve states, the
Treaty was amended by the Maastrict Agreement to impose an absolute
prohibition of all restrictions on the movement of capital, not only between
member states, but also between member states and third countries. However,
the Council was given authority in Article 57 to adopt measures on the
movement of capital to or from third countries "involving direct investment...
the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital
markets." Equally, Article 59 gives the Council the power to take "safeguard
measures with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months
if such measures are strictly necessary."
What then of restrictions on capital movements imposed by member states
not forming part of Euroland? Article 56 of the Treaty would seem to forbid
them without any safeguard provision whatsoever. However, it may be noted
that the earlier Directive permitting the use of safeguards has not been repealed
and conceivably could be applied by the three outsiders. It will be extremely
interesting to see what the situation is for the newly acceding ten member states
who surely will not at first become part of the European Monetary Union. Will
they be required to completely liberalize capital movements in accordance with
Article 56? Presumably, however, Directive 88/361 remains on the books, and
in any event, Article 59 of the Treaty continues to allow the Council, after
consulting the European Central Bank, to take safeguard measures with respect
to any difficulties that the new member states might experience with respect to
their currencies from inflows or outflows from third countries. Thus, the
European Union has not opted for the kind of free transfers provisions that the
United States has negotiated with Singapore and Chile.

